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NOTES
SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS AND THE ALASKA TRUST
ACT:  HAS ALASKA MOVED
OFFSHORE?
This Note examines the 1997 Alaska Trust Act, focusing on the
provisions which permit trust settlors to create self-settled
spendthrift trusts.  It first provides a brief background on the
historical treatment of such trusts, both domestically and
overseas.  The Note then describes the mechanics of the Act and
attempts to discern the purposes and motives behind the
legislation.  Finally, it discusses several hurdles in the path of
enforcement of the spendthrift provisions of the trusts, and
concludes that the trusts may be more effective as an estate
planning tool than as a true asset protection device.
I.  INTRODUCTION
On April 1, 1997, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles signed
House Bill 1011 (the “Alaska Trust Act” or the “Act”) into law.
The bill was sponsored by state Representative Al Vezey, who
explained that the bill was the result of his efforts to find a way to
stimulate economic development in Alaska and establish Alaska as
a global financial center.2  The Act has four primary goals: first, to
Copyright © 1999 by Jeremy M. Veit.  This Note is also available on the World
Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/16ALRVeit.
1. The full title of H.B. 101 is “An Act relating to certain irrevocable
transfers in trust, to the jurisdiction governing a trust, to challenges to trusts or
property transfers in trust, to the validity of trust interests, and to transfers of
certain trust interests; and providing for an effective date.”
2. See Trusts and Property Transfers in Trust: Hearing on HB 101 Before the
House Labor and Commerce Comm., 20th Legis., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997),
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permit the establishment of self-settled spendthrift trusts3 under
Alaska law (an “Alaska Trust”); second, to establish the conditions
under which a choice of law provision selecting Alaska law to
govern a trust would be effective; third, to amend Alaska’s already
debtor-friendly fraudulent transfer laws with respect to such trusts
by establishing time limits on fraudulent transfer actions; and
finally, to abolish Alaska’s statutory rule against perpetuities for
trusts established in the state.
Before the passage of the Act, every jurisdiction in the United
States agreed that as a matter of public policy, spendthrift
provisions in trusts were void as to creditors of the settlor.  Such
protection was available only offshore, in jurisdictions such as the
Cayman Islands or Bermuda.  The proponents of the Alaska Trust
Act hoped to attract millions of dollars worth of trust investment
(and the administrative fees that accompany it) to Alaska by
providing protection previously available only offshore.
This Note seeks to explain the mechanics of the new trusts and
examine their effectiveness in terms of both asset protection and
estate planning.  First, this Note will examine the historical
treatment of spendthrift trusts, both domestically and overseas.
Second, it will provide an overview of the mechanics of the Act as
well as discuss its goals and purposes.  Finally, this Note will discuss
the effectiveness of the trusts in achieving its various goals, and
concludes that many questions remain regarding each of the Act’s
purported benefits.
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Domestic Treatment of Spendthrift Trusts
A clause in a trust document restricting the beneficiary’s
ability to voluntarily or involuntarily transfer his interest in the
trust serves multiple purposes and is generally enforceable.4  First,
if the settlor seeks to provide a steady stream of income for the
beneficiary, the settlor can ensure that the beneficiary will not
available at the Alaska State Legislature Home Page (visited Nov. 6, 1999)
<http://www.legis.state.ak.us> [hereinafter House Hearings].
3. A self-settled trust is a trust that names the settlor as a beneficiary.  A
spendthrift trust protects the trust assets from creditors of the beneficiary.  A
“self-settled spendthrift trust” is a trust that does both.
4. See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 40,
147 (5th ed. 1973).
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transfer his interest in receiving distributions from the trust.5
Second, by including a spendthrift provision (or, in some states, by
merely making the distributions discretionary), the settlor
guarantees that creditors cannot reach the beneficiary’s interest.6
Spendthrift provisions, however, are increasingly
unenforceable.  Although several jurisdictions have held that a
spendthrift provision shields the interest of the beneficiary from
spousal or child support claims,7 the Supreme Court of Mississippi
recently held that a beneficiary’s interest is not immune from
attachment to satisfy the claims of the beneficiary’s intentional or
gross negligence tort creditors.8  In Sligh v. First National Bank of
Holmes County, the plaintiff filed suit against the trustee of a
spendthrift trust in an attempt to compel payment of a judgment
entered against the beneficiary of the trust.9  The judgment had
been entered as a result of the beneficiary’s failure to appear to
answer charges of gross negligence arising from an automobile
accident.10  The lower court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss on the grounds that “a tort judgment creditor may not
garnish the trustee of a spendthrift trust in which the tort judgment
defendant is a mere lifetime discretionary income beneficiary, nor
are the assets of such trust subject to the claims of the tort
judgment creditor.”11  In Mississippi, the courts had long held that
the limitations imposed by the grantor should be recognized and
upheld.12  The Sligh court, in a 7-2 decision, found that the public
policy considerations invoked to uphold the enforceability of
spendthrift provisions “do not weigh in favor of enforcing
spendthrift trust provisions as against the claims of tort creditors or
those found liable for gross negligence.”13  The policy rationale was
simple:
5. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1995).
6. See id.
7. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, at 156.
8. See Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes County, 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss.
1997).
9. See id. at 1023.
10. See id. at 1022.
11. Id. at 1023.
12. See Calhoun v. Markow, 151 So. 547, 549 (Miss. 1933); Leigh v. Harrison,
11 So. 604, 606 (Miss. 1892).  However, the Mississippi courts had also recognized
the well-established rule that such protection may not be afforded when the
beneficiary is the settlor himself.  See Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Walter E. Heller &
Co., 204 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1967); see also infra notes 23-47.
13. Sligh, 704 So. 2d at 1027.
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Public policy deems it so important to deter the commission of
intentional torts or acts of gross negligence, that we allow victims
of gross negligence or intentional torts to recover damages above
and beyond what is necessary to compensate them for their
injuries, i.e., punitive damages.  However, the intended deterrent
effect would be completely lost upon individuals whose interests
are immune from the satisfaction of such claims.14
Although at least one commentator has suggested that the rule in
Sligh was decided on “an extremely attractive set of facts to
challenge the established doctrine,”15 the court noted that “[l]egal
scholars for years have called for the recognition of a public policy
exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine in favor of tort judgment
creditors.”16  Regardless, the rule established by Sligh is clear.  In
Mississippi, “a beneficiary’s interest in spendthrift trust assets is not
immune from attachment to satisfy the claims of the beneficiary’s
intentional or gross negligence tort creditors, and . . . such claims
take priority over any remainder interest in such assets.”17
Other states have limited the effect of spendthrift provisions
by statute.  The Louisiana Trust Code provides that a court
may permit seizure of any portion of the beneficiary’s interest in
trust income and principal in its discretion and as may be just
under the circumstances if the claim is based upon a judgment
for . . . [a]n offense or quasi-offense committed by the
beneficiary or by a person for whose acts the beneficiary is
individually responsible.18
Georgia has passed a similar statute, which provides that a
spendthrift provision prohibiting involuntary transfers is not valid
as to tort judgments, alimony, or child support claims.19  The
California Probate Code limits the protection of spendthrift
provisions to the amount “necessary for the education and support
of the beneficiary.”20  Any remaining interest “may be applied to
the satisfaction of a money judgment against the beneficiary.”21
Other states have similar provisions.22  Thus, the Alaska Trust Act,
which attempts to give greater force to spendthrift provisions, was
14. Id. at 1028.
15. Ronald R. Volkmer, Tort Creditor’s Access to Spendthrift Trust, 25 EST.
PLAN. 187, 187 (1998).
16. Sligh, 704 So. 2d at 1026 (citing several law review articles calling for such
an exception).
17. Id. at 1029.
18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 (West 1991).
19. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c) (1996).
20. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15307 (West 1991).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 555.13 (West 1988); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 59-03-10 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-10-13 (Michie 1999).
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passed in a legal environment in which the trend was a weakening
of such provisions.
B. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
As mentioned above,23 one exception to the validity of
spendthrift trusts recognized in virtually every U.S. jurisdiction is
the rule allowing creditors to reach the interest of the beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust when the beneficiary is the settlor of the
trust.24  This rule is imposed by statute in many states and judicially
imposed in others. 25  The Second Restatement of Trusts lays down
the rule that is applied by nearly every jurisdiction:
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a
provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his
interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for
support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can
reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of
the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit.26
Thus, even where distributions to the settlor are at the discretion of
the trustee, a creditor may reach the total amount that the settlor
could receive from the trust.  This amount could conceivably entail
the entire trust.
The rule against self-settled spendthrift trusts finds its roots in
a 1487 English statute, which states that “[a]ll deeds of gift of goods
and chattels, made or to be made in trust to the use of that person
or persons that made the same deed or gift, be void and of none
effect.”27  This rule does not depend on the settlor’s intent (or lack
23. See supra note 12.
24. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 40; AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM
F. FRATCHER, 2A THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (4th ed. 1987).
25. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-2 (West 1994) (“[I]f the settlor is also a
beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary
transfer of his beneficial interest will not prevent his creditors from satisfying
claims from his interest in the trust estate.”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
7-3.1 (1992) (“A disposition in trust for the use of the creator is void as against the
existing or subsequent creditors of the creator.”); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
112.035 (West 1995) (“If the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision
restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest does not
prevent his creditors from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust estate.”).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1971).
27. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 24, § 156 at 168 n.4 (citing 3 Hen. 7, ch. 4
(1487) (Engl.)).
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thereof) to defraud creditors existing or future.28  There is ample
case law suggesting that this rule is well-settled.29
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has explained the simple
rationale behind the rule:
This rule promotes a valid public policy: A person ought not to
be able to shelter his assets from his creditors in a discretionary
trust of which he is the beneficiary and thus be able to enjoy all
the benefits of ownership of the property without any of the
burdens.30
In his treatise on trusts, George T. Bogert explained further:
[T]o hold otherwise would be to give the unexampled
opportunity to unscrupulous persons to shelter their property
before engaging in speculative business enterprises, to mislead
creditors into thinking that the settlor still owned the property
since he appeared to be receiving its income, and thereby to
work a gross fraud on creditors who might place reliance on the
former prosperity and financial solidity of the debtor.  In some
cases there would be an actual intent to cheat or hinder creditors
but it would be secret and could not be proved.31
Thus, Alaska’s adoption of a statute that permits trust settlors to
protect assets from creditors while retaining an interest in the trust
intentionally creates an exception to a very well-established rule.32
Although the rule is well-settled, its application has not been
entirely uniform.  There are discrepancies from state to state on the
issue of what constitutes a self-settled trust.33  Furthermore, some
early tax cases suggest that creditors may not reach the assets of a
trust where the settlor is one of multiple discretionary
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., In re CRS Steam, Inc., 217 B.R. 365, 371 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998);
In re Nagel, 580 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Iowa 1998); Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d
802, 809 (Iowa 1991); In re Hertsberg, 578 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1998); BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 4, § 40; SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 24, §156.2.  But see
Richard W. Hompesch II et al., Does the New Alaska Trust Act Provide an
Alternative to the Foreign Trust, J. OF ASSET PROTECTION, July/Aug. 1997 at 9 n.1
(1997) (citing possible statutory and common law exceptions).
30. Nagel, 580 N.W.2d at 811; see also John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule
Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes with
Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 426 (1998); James T. Lorenzetti, The
Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102 COM. L.J. 138, 139
(1997).
31. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 40.
32. It should be noted that there are limited exceptions to the rule against self-
settled spendthrift trusts, specifically within the realm of retirement trusts.  For a
more detailed discussion, see Sullivan, supra note 30, at 428-32.
33. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your
Cake and Eating it Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 31 n.105 (1994).
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beneficiaries.34  In one case, for example, the settlor established an
irrevocable trust naming himself and his wife as beneficiaries until
their passing, with the principal to be distributed to his children
when they reached the age of twenty-five.35  Distributions to him
and his wife were left to the unfettered discretion of the trustee.36
The Commissioner of the IRS held that the transfer was a
completed gift and subject to a gift tax because a mere “hope or
passive expectancy” of income from the trust was not sufficient to
constitute a retention of a right.37  Recognizing the validity of
spendthrift trusts generally, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the Commissioner’s decision:
[T]here is no New York decision holding that the rights of
creditors would differ from those available to them in a case
where the trust is set up by a third party if the exercise of a
power for his benefit is wholly dependent upon the discretion of
the trustee.38
The court, interpreting New York law, distinguished the case from
those relied upon by treatises and the Restatement, stating that
“[i]n the principal ones at least there was no beneficiary other than
the grantor or his estate in whose favor the power might be
exercised at the option of the trustee.”39  Concluding that “the law
of New York respecting the right of . . . creditors to reach the
income of the trust is in doubt,”40 the court upheld the decision of
the Commissioner to tax the transfer to the trust as a completed
gift.
However, New York law on the subject became much less in
doubt forty years later when the Appellate Division, an
intermediate state court, decided Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank.41  In Vanderbilt, a creditor sought to reach the
assets of a trust established by the debtor of which the debtor was a
beneficiary.42  The trust was irrevocable and contained a spendthrift
provision.43  Distributions of trust income to the settlor were
mandatory, while the trustee could, at his discretion, distribute
34. See Herzog v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1941).
35. See id. at 592-93.
36. See id. at 593.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 594.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 473 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
42. See id. at 245-46.
43. See id.
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portions of the trust principal as well.44  The court held that the
creditor could reach not only the debtor’s interest in distributions
of income from the trust, but the trust corpus itself, as the settlor
retained a discretionary interest in the corpus.45  The court relied
on the well-known rule against self-settled spendthrift trusts:
[W]hen a person creates for his own benefit a discretionary trust,
his creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee
under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his
benefit, even though the trustee in the exercise of his discretion
wishes to pay nothing to the beneficiary or to his creditors, and
even though the beneficiary could not compel the trustee to pay
him anything.46
In spite of the presence of other beneficiaries,47 which was the
distinguishing factor relied upon in the Second Circuit case, the
court refused to enforce the spendthrift provision even where the
beneficiary/settlor was a discretionary beneficiary.  Thus, what
appeared to be an exception to the rule against self-settled
spendthrift trusts was eliminated.  There is very little law
suggesting that the rule is anything but uniformly accepted
domestically.
C. Overseas Asset Protection Trusts
As a means to avoid the rule against self-settled spendthrift
trusts, Americans seeking strong asset protection have increasingly
turned to offshore asset protection trusts (“OAPT’s”).48  These
trusts, which are established under the laws of certain foreign
jurisdictions with laws favorable to the protection of assets from
future creditors, provide the dual benefit of strong spendthrift
protection while permitting the settlor to control and benefit from
the property held in trust.49  It has been estimated that over one
trillion dollars of foreign trust funds are held in asset protection
trusts.50
Regardless of ethical or public policy concerns, the placement
of assets in OAPT’s presents many practical barriers between a
creditor and the assets held in trust.51  However, OAPT’s are not
44. See id. at 245.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 245-46.
47. The corpus of the trust was to be paid to the settlor’s children upon her
passing.  See id. at 245.
48. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 33, at 13.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 13-14.
51. See id. at 59-61.
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without risks and costs, such as problems associated with political
instability and the expense of establishing and administering an
offshore trust.52  The Alaska Trust Act is an attempt to attract trust
investment in the state of Alaska by providing the protection of
offshore trusts without the risks of dealing with a foreign
jurisdiction.
III.  THE ALASKA TRUST ACT OF 1997
A. Overview
The primary effect of the Act was to rewrite Alaska Statutes
section 34.40.110.  The new statute permits the settlor of a trust to
provide that “the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be
either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before payment or
delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee.”53  The
statute makes no exception for cases in which the beneficiary in
question is the settlor himself.
The rewritten section further provides that such a transfer
restriction prevents anyone (expressly including present and future
creditors) from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary’s interest
except under any of the following conditions: (1) the transfer
establishing the trust “was intended in whole or in part to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors or other persons;”54 (2) the trust permits
the settlor to “revoke or terminate all or part of the trust without
the consent of a person who has a substantial beneficial interest in
the trust;”55 (3) the “trust requires that all or part of the trust’s
income or principal, or both, must be distributed to the settlor;”56
or (4) the settlor is in default of making a child support payment at
the time of the transfer establishing the trust.57
The above limits on the availability of an enforceable
spendthrift provision are not absolute.  The Act establishes that a
transfer restriction is still valid if the settlor retains the right to veto
a distribution from the trust or the right to receive distributions
from the income or corpus of the trust at the discretion of a person
other than the settlor, such as a trustee.58  The statute also
establishes a time limitation on actions brought under the
52. See id. at 66-71.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a) (LEXIS 1998).
54. Id. § 34.40.110(b)(1).
55. Id. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
56. Id. § 34.40.110(b)(3) (emphasis added).
57. See id. § 34.40.110(b)(4).
58. See id. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
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fraudulent conveyance laws.59  A person who was a creditor when
the trust was created and is attempting to satisfy a claim by
reaching the assets of the trust may only do so if the action is
brought within four years after the allegedly fraudulent transfer
was made or “one year after the transfer is or reasonably could
have been discovered by the person.”60  A person who becomes a
creditor subsequent to the establishment of the trust may only
bring an action within four years after the transfer is made.61
Alaska’s fraudulent conveyance statute was amended to
incorporate the new statute of limitations imposed by the new
law.62
The Act also abolished the rule against perpetuities63 for
essentially all trusts by amending Alaska Statutes section
34.27.050(a) to include situations where “the interest is in a trust
and all or part of the income or principal of the trust may be
distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a person who is living
when the trust is created.”64  A trust could conceivably qualify for
the abolition of the rule against perpetuities by giving the trustee
the discretion to distribute one cent of the income or principal of
the trust to anyone who is alive at the time of the creation of the
trust, while keeping the rest of the trust’s assets in perpetuity.
The Act also established that a choice of law provision in a
trust document designating Alaska law to “govern the validity,
construction, and administration of the trust”65 and subjecting the
trust to the jurisdiction of Alaska courts is valid as long as three
conditions are met.  First, some or all of the trust assets must be
deposited in Alaska and administered by a “qualified person.”66  A
“qualified person” includes “an individual whose true and
permanent home is in” Alaska,67 a trust company that has its
principal place of business in Alaska,68 or a bank that “possesses
and exercises trust powers and has its principal place of business
59. See id. § 34.40.110(d)(1).
60. Id. § 34.40.110(d)(1)(B).
61. Id. § 34.40.110(d)(2).
62. See id. § 34.40.010.
63. “The rule prohibiting a grant of an estate unless the interest must vest, if at
all, no later than 21 years after the death of some person alive when the interest
was created.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  (7th ed. 1999).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3).
65. Id. § 13.36.035(c).
66. Id. § 13.36.035(c)(1).
67. Id. § 13.36.390(1)(A).
68. See id. § 13.36.390(1)(B).
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in” Alaska.69  Second, the powers of the Alaska trustee must
include maintaining the records for the trust and preparing or
arranging for the preparation of income tax returns that must be
filed by the trust.70  Finally, part of the administration must take
place in Alaska, including the physical maintenance of trust
records.71  Once a trust contains such a state jurisdiction provision
designating Alaska law, the “validity, construction, and
administration of [the] trust . . . are determined by the laws of”
Alaska.72
The Act further grants exclusive jurisdiction to Alaska courts
over “proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the
internal affairs of trusts,” including trusts with valid choice of law
provisions as described above.73  The statute also permits Alaska
courts to entertain proceedings involving trusts registered or
having their principal place of administration outside of Alaska as
long as the requirements of section 13.36.035(c) are met.74  Thus, an
out-of-state settlor could establish an Alaska Trust merely by
putting such provision in the trust documents and maintaining
some of the trust’s assets in Alaska.75  The Alaska trustee need only
administer those assets76 and maintain records and prepare tax
returns on a nonexclusive basis.77  The statutory requirements for
access to the protection afforded by the Alaska Trust Act are in
fact quite minimal.
B. Desired Effects
The potential benefits to the settlor of a self-settled spendthrift
trust are two-fold.  First, the settlor retains the obvious benefits of
protecting assets from creditors while maintaining access to the
assets, although such access is limited.  The drafter of the
legislation, Jonathan G. Blattmachr, and several estate planning
lawyers have written a series of articles touting the benefits of the
newly available Alaska Trusts.78
69. Id. § 13.36.390(1)(C).
70. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(3).
71. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(4).
72. Id. § 13.36.035(d).
73. Id. § 13.36.035(a).
74. See id. § 13.36.035(c).
75. See id. § 13.36.035.
76. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(1).
77. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(3).
78. See, e.g., Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. Hompesch II, Alaska v.
Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, 12 PROB. & PROP. 32, 38
(1998) (“Delaware tried to match the Alaska Trust Act but fell short.”);
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Citing “substantial concerns held by Americans about the
potential of financially devastating legal judgments,”79 and a “trend
over the last 100 years in the trust law of this country . . . to make
trusts weaker and weaker,”80 proponents of the Act have touted the
asset protection provided by a self-settled spendthrift trust.
Although neither the Alaska nor the similar Delaware statutes81
will enforce the spendthrift provisions in trusts if the transfer to the
trust was fraudulent,82 the trusts afford protection that had
previously been available only by placing money in offshore
trusts.83
Perhaps even more important than protecting assets from
creditors are the potential tax benefits of a self-settled spendthrift
trust.84  Ordinarily, the assets of a self-settled trust would be
included in the settlor’s estate at his death and would therefore be
subject to estate taxes.  However, the IRS has held that inclusion in
a decedent’s estate is largely determined by creditors’ access to
those assets.85  While the IRS has not yet held whether assets in an
Alaska or Delaware self-settled spendthrift trust will be subject to
Hompesch, supra note 29, at 16 (concluding that Alaska is an “attractive trust
situs”); Jonathan Blattmachr et al., Alaska’s Revision of its Trust Act, Which Sets
Out to Permit Trusts to Preserve Assets and Reduce Taxes, May Have Implications
for Trust Planning Nationwide, THE NAT’L L. J., June 16, 1997, at B5 (“The new
Alaska Trust Act offers a new tool in accomplishing the dual goals of asset
protection and tax reduction.”); Jonathan Blattmachr et al., New Alaska Trust Act
Provides Many Estate Planning Opportunities, 24 EST. PLAN. 347, 347 (1997)
[hereinafter Blattmachr, New Alaska Trust Act] (stating that the Act “provides
new estate planning opportunities for clients throughout the entire country”).
79. Hompesch, supra note 29, at 9; see also Sullivan, supra note 30, at 442
(“The Act . . . legitimizes the contemporary urge to shelter assets from future
lawsuits and to protect wealth from a litigation system that many Americans deem
to be both excessive and illogical.” (referring to Delaware’s similar legislation)).
80. House Hearings, supra note 2 (comments of Representative Al Vezey).
81. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
82. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(1) (LEXIS 1998); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (Supp. 1998) (limiting actions brought for a remedy against
property in the trusts to those brought under Delaware’s Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act).
83. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 33.
84. See Carol King, Dynasty and Asset Protection Trusts Find New Home in
Alaska, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH, Nov. 3, 1997 (quoting Richard
Hompesch II as stating that “[t]he creditor protection is simply the means to
estate planning”).
85. See infra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
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estate taxes,86 proponents of the trusts have suggested that a settlor
will be able to avoid estate taxes on such assets.87  Thus, an Alaska
Trust, working as intended, would provide not only protection
from creditors, but would permit the settlor to enjoy the benefits of
an interest in trust assets, without paying estate taxes on those
assets upon his passing.
C. Purposes
The motivation of the legislature in enacting the Alaska Trust
Act is quite clear.  The sponsor of the bill described it as the result
of his “desire to find out what needs to happen to make Alaska,
and particularly Anchorage, a financial service center for the
world.”88  The statute is designed to ensure that the Alaskan
financial service industry reaps the benefits of the expected influx
of trust capital to Alaska.  As noted above, in order to qualify for
the protections of the Alaska Trust, a trust must keep some of the
trust’s assets in Alaska, and the trust must be administered by an
Alaskan trustee or trust company.89  The Alaska trustee also has
the responsibility of preparing tax statements,90 a service for which
the trustee would presumably be paid.  Representative Vezey
himself noted that “the management fees are substantial.”91
The Senate Judiciary Committee considering House Bill 101
heard testimony from a trusts and estates practitioner supporting
the bill.  He testified that it was a means to bring a “clean industry”
to Alaska in the same way Delaware has attracted corporations
and South Dakota has attracted central processing for credit card
companies by modifying their laws.92
86. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (Sept. 11, 1998) (holding that a transfer to such
a trust is complete for gift tax purposes, but expressly withholding judgment on
the inclusion of the assets in the settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes).
87. See, e.g., Blattmachr, New Alaska Trust Act, supra note 78, at 357 (“[T]he
new law . . . permits the grantor to make transfers to the trust that . . . may be
excludable from the grantor’s gross estate.”).
88. Trusts and Property Transfers in Trust: Hearing on HB 101 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee., 20th Legis., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997), available at the
Alaska Legislature Home Page (visited Nov. 6, 1999)
<http://www.legis.state.ak.us> [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (comments of
Representative Al Vezey).
89. See ALASKA STAT. §13.36.035(c) (LEXIS 1998).
90. See id. § 13.36.035(c)(3).
91. See Senate Hearings, supra note 88 (comments of Representative Al
Vezey).
92. Id.
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Shortly after Alaska passed its Trust Act, Delaware passed a
similar piece of legislation.93  However, the Delaware law permits
certain classes of creditors to reach the beneficiary/settlor’s
interest,94 which has important tax implications that will be
discussed later.95  For example, the Alaska Act states that a transfer
restriction prevents present and future creditors from reaching the
assets of the trusts only if the settlor is not in default by thirty or
more days of making a child support payment at the time of the
transfer.96  The protection afforded by the Delaware Act, however,
does not apply to indebtedness that arises out of an agreement or
court order for the payment of spousal or child support, regardless
of whether such indebtedness arises before or after the transfer
into the trust is made.97
IV.  DISCUSSION
Much of the literature regarding Alaska Trusts has been
generated by practitioners with a vested interest in the availability
of the trusts to out-of-state settlors.98  Not surprisingly, their
conclusions generally have been quite positive.99  However, Alaska
Trusts may not be the panacea envisioned by the Act’s drafters.
Most of the treatment of the Alaska legislation and similar efforts
in Delaware by academics, the mass media, and other practitioners
has been more critical of the motives behind the Alaska
93. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (Supp. 1998).
94. See id. § 3573 (Supp. 1998); see also Martin M. Shenkman, Warming up to
an Alaska Trust, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 7 (interview with
Douglas J. Blattmachr).
95. See infra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
96. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(4) (LEXIS 1998).
97. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573(1); see also Sullivan, supra note 30, at
450-51.
98. For example, John E. Sullivan III is a private attorney whose
concentrations include asset protection planning; Douglas J. Blattmachr is the
President and CEO of the Alaska Trust Co.; Jonathan G. Blattmachr is a private
attorney in New York who drafted the legislation; Richard W. Hompesch II is a
private attorney in Anchorage, Alaska, who practices estate planning, probate,
and tax law, and who testified before the Alaska Legislature to urge passage of the
legislation; Gideon Rothschild is a private attorney in New York whose practice
includes trusts and estates, asset protection, and probate law; and Richard S.
Thwaites, Jr. is Chairman of the Alaska Trust Company and was actively involved
in the enactment of the Alaska Trust Act.
99. See supra  note 78.
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Legislature’s actions and skeptical about the advertised benefits of
the Alaska Trusts.100
When operating as intended, an Alaska Trust would
theoretically provide to the Alaskan or out-of-state settlor the dual
benefits of asset protection and estate tax relief, while permitting
the settlor to maintain a beneficial interest in the trust during his
lifetime.  In addition, such a trust would be perpetual.  While these
benefits may indeed be attainable, the effect of the establishment
of such trusts is untested and unclear.  First, in terms of asset
protection, Alaska Trusts may be susceptible to the fraudulent
conveyance laws of other states.  Further, the case law on the effect
of a choice of law provision in the bankruptcy context does not
clearly answer the question of whether such a provision in an
Alaska Trust would be enforceable.  Thirdly, the tax benefits of a
self-settled spendthrift trust are far from guaranteed.  Finally, the
effect of the abolition of the rule against perpetuities is unclear,
particularly with respect to land situated outside of Alaska.  Each
of these points will be considered in turn.
A. Asset Protection
1. Fraudulent Transfer.  Although the Act contained
provisions designed to protect Alaska Trusts from fraudulent
conveyance actions, they may be susceptible to charges that
transfers into the trusts constitute fraudulent conveyances,
particularly in out-of-state courts.  Before passage of the Alaska
100. See, e.g., Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law For Sale: Alaska and Delaware
Compete for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 874 (concluding that Alaska and Delaware have
sacrificed “well-settled concepts of fairness in creditors’ rights issues” in order to
“bolster [their] econom[ies] and bring revenue into the state[s]”); Karen Gebbia-
Pinetti, As Certain as Debt and Taxes: Estate Planning, Asset-Protection Trusts,
and Conflicting State Law, SC60 ALI-ABA 179 (1998) (concluding that the trusts
are vulnerable to challenge with respect to fraudulent transfer laws); Brigid
McMenamin, Flimsy Shelters, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 94 (warning that the
Alaska Trusts may be vulnerable to both creditors and the IRS); Leslie C.
Giordani & Duncan B. Osborne, Will the Alaska Trusts Work?, 3 J. ASSET
PROTECTION 7 (1997) (discussing the vulnerability of Alaska Trusts to the “full
faith and credit” clause of the United States Constitution); John Paul Parks,
Evaluating the Alaska Trust’s Ability to Shield Assets From the Claims of
Creditors, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 1998, at 31 (“[T]he right of the Arizona Superior
Court to entertain proceedings involving Alaska trusts on forum non-conveniens
grounds and Alaska’s obligation to adhere to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
cause the Alaska trust to compare unfavorably to the international trust as a
means of avoiding the claims of creditors.”).
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Trust Act, Alaska already had more stringent fraudulent transfer
laws than most other U.S. jurisdictions.  As it did even before the
Act, the Alaska fraudulent conveyance statute101 requires a
demonstration of actual intent to defraud.102  Specifically, the
statute voids transfers “made with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors . . . with the like intent, as against the persons so
hindered, delayed, or defrauded.”103  The majority of American
states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(“UFTA”),104 which permits a finding of constructive fraud:
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or
a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his
ability to pay as they became due.105
Thus, in the majority of American jurisdictions, fraudulent transfer
laws not only include those transfers made with specific fraudulent
intent, but also those made without receiving equivalent value
where the transferor should have believed that they would incur
debts beyond their ability to pay.  The Bankruptcy Code also
proscribes constructively fraudulent transfers in section 548106 and
further permits a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid any transfer that is
“voidable under applicable law.”107
101. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (LEXIS 1998).
102. See, e.g., Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Alaska 1993) (holding
that “to prove liability for participation in a fraudulent conveyance scheme, a
plaintiff must establish . . . [t]he specific intent of each participant in the scheme to
hinder, delay and defraud a creditor of one who participated in the scheme.”).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (LEXIS 1998).
104. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 100, at 217.
105. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 301 (1984) (emphasis
added).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (1994).
107. Id. § 544(b).
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The intent requirement of fraudulent transfer laws is often
determined through the use of circumstantial evidence, often called
the “badges of fraud.”108  A badge of fraud has been defined as “a
fact tending to throw suspicion upon the questioned transaction,
excites distrust as to bona fides, raises an inference that a
conveyance is fraudulent and by its presence usually requires a
showing of good faith.”109  Commonly identified badges of fraud
include:
(1) The lack or inadequacy of consideration;
(2) The family, friendship, or other close relationship among the
parties;
(3) The retention of possession, benefit, or use of the property in
question;
(4) The financial condition of the defendant both before and after
the transfer in question;
(5) The existence or cumulative effect of a pattern of transactions or
a course of conduct after the onset of financial difficulties; and
(6) The general chronology of events.110
The third badge in the list above may be particularly applicable for
transfers to Alaska Trusts.  Minimal compliance with the
requirements of the statute (which would permit, for example, the
retention of veto power over distributions from the trust) may be
found to be insufficient to escape the grasps of the fraudulent
conveyance laws of creditor-friendly jurisdictions.
The Alaska Trust Act further restricts the state’s already
limited fraudulent transfer law by imposing a statutory time
limitation on challenges to Alaska Trusts.111  Although the statute
appears to make challenges to transfers to Alaska Trusts as
fraudulent very difficult, the Legislature’s attempt to shield the
trusts from such challenges was probably in vain as applied to out-
of-state settlors.  Alaska’s stringent standards for fraudulent
transfer actions would probably not apply to such settlors.
Challenges to transfers to Alaska Trusts are quite distinct from
challenges to the validity of the spendthrift provisions of the trusts
themselves.112
In a 1989 Massachusetts case, a trustee in bankruptcy brought
a claim pursuant to section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid
108. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 33, at 53.
109. In re Reed, 566 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1977) (citing Mohar v. McLelland
Lumber Co., 501 P.2d 722 (Idaho 1972)).
110. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 33, at 54 (citing In re May, 12 B.R. 618, 627
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980)).
111. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
112. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 100, at 243.
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an allegedly fraudulent transfer.113  The Bankruptcy Court applied
the “most significant relationship” test found in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law to determine whether to apply
Connecticut or Massachusetts law,114 giving little weight to a
provision in the allegedly fraudulent security agreement stating
that Connecticut law would govern the agreement:
The choice-of-law clause carries little weight in the context of
this adversary proceeding.  The parties to a contract can specify
which forum’s law will govern their contract, and courts often
follow their choice because both parties to the contract, and
therefore to the suit on the contract, have agreed upon the
choice.  But this is a fraudulent conveyance action, not a contract
action.  And one of the parties to this suit—the Trustee, who
stands in the shoes of the creditors—was not a party to the
contract.  The parties to a contractual conveyance cannot in their
contract make a choice-of-law that binds creditors who allege
that they were defrauded by the conveyance.  The choice-of-law
binds only parties to the contract, not the Trustee or the
creditors.115
The court dismissed the debtor’s reliance on the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law, which states that “[t]he law of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied”116 as applying only “to suits between parties
to a contract regarding their rights and duties under the
contract.”117  The court went on to apply the “most significant
interest” test without regard to the choice-of-law provision in the
security agreement.  Thus, a bankruptcy trustee will more likely
avoid a transfer into an Alaska Trust if the transfer was fraudulent
under the laws of the state with the most significant relationship to
the assets and the debtor.  In a case where the settlor has satisfied
only the minimal requirements under the Alaska Trust Act, the
most significant relationship is unlikely to be with Alaska.118  By
analogy, a court in the non-bankruptcy context will apply a similar
analysis to a fraudulent conveyance action by a creditor seeking to
reach assets of a settlor who is not in bankruptcy.  For example,
one commentator suggests the situation of an Illinois debtor who
transfers assets to a friend in Alaska and is subsequently sued by an
113. See In re Morse Tool, 108 B.R. 384, 385 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 386.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 (1971).
117. Morse, 108 B.R. at 386.
118. For a more detailed analysis of fraudulent transfer and choice-of-law
doctrine as applied to Alaska and Delaware self-settled trusts, see Gebbia-Pinetti,
supra note 100, at 241-59.
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Illinois creditor seeking to recover the assets as a fraudulent
transfer under Illinois law.119  Even if the debtor and his friend have
agreed that the transfer would be governed by Alaska law, it is
highly unlikely that a court would give effect to their attempt to
bind the creditor to Alaska fraudulent transfer law.120
An out-of-state court is likely to hear a fraudulent conveyance
action regarding an Alaska Trust in spite of the Act’s purported
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Alaska courts over
“proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal
affairs of trusts.”121  First, it is unclear whether a fraudulent
conveyance action falls under the heading of “internal affairs” of a
trust.  Second, the Restatement is quite clear that “[a] state may
entertain an action even though the state of the applicable law has
provided that action on the particular claim shall not be brought
outside its territory.”122  In a fraudulent conveyance action, Alaskan
law may not even be the “applicable law” in the first place.
Finally, the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution123 would require that Alaska give full effect to the
judgment of an out-of-state court that a transfer to an Alaska Trust
was a fraudulent conveyance.  The only possibly applicable
exception recognized by the Restatement is likely irrelevant.
Section 103 declares that a state need not recognize or enforce the
judgment of another state if such recognition or enforcement
would “involve an improper interference with important interests”
of the state being asked to enforce the judgment.124  The comment
to the Restatement provision describes the application of this
exception as “extremely narrow.”125  A state’s “strong public
policy” against enforcement of the claim will not suffice to
constitute interference with important interests.126  The full faith
and credit clause distinguishes the protection of the offshore trusts
from the protection of an Alaska Trust.  The above analysis fully
applies to an offshore trust except for the enforceability of the
judgment of another state.  A transfer to an offshore trust would be
119. See id. at 247.
120. See id.
121. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(a) (LEXIS 1998).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 91 (1971).
123. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 103 (1971) (amended
1989).
125. Id. cmt. a.
126. Id. § 117.
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far more impervious to attachment by creditors because of the
judgment’s unenforceability.
2. Direct Challenges to Enforceability.  A successful action by
a creditor to reach the assets of an Alaska Trust under out-of-state
fraudulent transfer law has serious implications for the ability of
the trusts to provide the asset protection touted by the Act’s
proponents.  However, the effect of such vulnerability on the tax
benefits of the trusts is unclear.127  A direct challenge to the validity
of the spendthrift provision of an Alaska Trust, on the other hand,
would have far more serious implications than a fraudulent transfer
in terms of the tax benefits of a spendthrift trust.128
A challenge to the spendthrift provision is likely to arise in the
bankruptcy context, where a court must decide if the assets held in
an Alaska Trust are part of the debtor’s estate for purposes of
bankruptcy.  This determination has yet to be made by a
bankruptcy court, and is crucial to the success of the trusts as a
viable means of asset protection.  Section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code129 provides the guidelines for inclusion and exclusion of assets
in the debtor’s estate in bankruptcy and states in seemingly clear
language that “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”130  This
section has traditionally been applied to protect valid spendthrift
trusts131 and allow access to trusts where a spendthrift provision is
unenforceable.132  If a court gives effect to a choice of law provision
in trust documents selecting Alaska law to govern, then the
spendthrift provision will have the desired effect of shielding the
trust assets from the creditors of the settlor.  However, case law
suggests that a court may be unwilling to allow the debtor/settlor
simply to select the “applicable nonbankruptcy law.”133
127. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 100, at 257-59.
128. See id. at 258-59.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1993).
130. Id. § 541(c)(2) (1993).
131. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 104 B.R. 112, 116-18 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989)
(holding that alienation restrictions in an annuity plan were valid under New York
law and therefore excluded the debtor’s beneficial interest in the annuity plan
from his estate).
132. See, e.g., In re Robbins, 211 B.R. 2, 4-5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997) (holding
that an annuity containing a spendthrift clause was self-settled and unenforceable
under Connecticut law and therefore constituted property of the debtor’s estate).
133. In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Rothery, 200
B.R. 644, 650 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., In re Consolidated Capital
Equities Corp., 143 B.R. 80, 84 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (“A suit to avoid a
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The debtor in a recent New York case, In re Portnoy,
established a trust in the Jersey Channel Islands, and transferred
his assets to that trust in 1989.134  The trust, which contained a
transfer restriction and named Portnoy (the settlor) as a
beneficiary, purported “to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the
trust’s interpretation in the Jersey courts.”135  In 1990, one of
Portnoy’s creditors filed suit, and in 1991 obtained a judgment
against him.136  In 1995, the creditor, having never received any
payment from Portnoy, learned of the existence of the offshore
trust and filed suit alleging that the transfer of assets to the trust
constituted a fraudulent conveyance.137  The state court directed
Portnoy to make weekly installment payments to the creditor, and
after Portnoy’s motion for a stay pending appeal failed, he filed a
chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.138
One of the creditor’s claims for relief depended on a
determination of whether the debtor concealed a property interest
in the trust.139  Property interests are created and defined by local
law, leaving the court to determine “which local law will supply the
substantive rule.”140  Portnoy contended that the court should give
effect to the provision in the trust declaring that it was to be
governed by Jersey law.141  The court identified Jersey’s interest “in
determining what rights remain in the settlor of a trust under its
law,”142 and noted that “[b]oth federal and New York choice of law
principles generally respect a designation in a trust which provides
that a certain law will be applied to interpret it.”143  However, the
court concluded “that New York has the weightier concern in
determining whether or not whatever rights Portnoy retained after
he formed the trust could be considered to constitute a property
interest.”144  To reach this conclusion, the court applied New York’s
strong public policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts, noting
that this policy did not depend on the debtor’s insolvency at the
fraudulent conveyance is not a suit on a contract and is not governed by a
contractual choice of law provision.”).
134. See Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 689.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 690-91.
137. See id. at 691.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 695-96.
140. Id. at 696.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 696-97 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 698.
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time of the creation of the trust.145  The court further noted that “it
is not at all clear what the policy behind the Jersey amendment is
except, perhaps, to augment business.”146
While Portnoy was not decided under section 541, a
bankruptcy or other court could apply similar reasoning to render
the spendthrift provision of an Alaska Trust unenforceable as
against creditors of the settlor.  Proponents of the trusts conclude
that “[t]he Portnoy case appears to be the exception, based quite
apparently on its exceptional facts, to the general rule that the
grantor or settlor of a trust can specify and thereby control what
law governs spendthrift protection of a trust.”147  The facts of
Portnoy were indeed damning,148 but the import is clear.  The policy
against self-settled spendthrift trusts is potentially strong enough to
overcome a trust provision selecting the law of another jurisdiction
to govern the interpretation of the trust.
As an example of the application of section 541(c), a 1989
Iowa case149 provides an interesting contrast to Portnoy because the
court gave full effect to a provision dictating that the validity and
effect of the annuity were to be determined under New York law
even though neither party even suggested that New York law
might apply.150  The court, however, did not determine whether the
spendthrift provision would have been enforced under Iowa law.
This case, and other similar cases, where a Bankruptcy Court has
found that a choice of law provision is valid and enforceable in
dictating “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” suggest that a court may
be more willing to give effect to such provisions in the absence of
bad faith and where the laws selected are those of a domestic
jurisdiction.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 700 (citation omitted).
147. Hompesch, supra note 29, at 12.
148. For example, Portnoy created the trust less than eighteen months after
obtaining a loan from the creditor and two months after learning that his business
was in trouble.  See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Further, Portnoy retained the right to remove and replace the trustee at will, see
id., which supports the court’s apparent finding that Portnoy was more than a
mere beneficiary of the trust.  Portnoy also attempted to protect his earned
income by depositing it into accounts in his wife and daughter’s names, and
asserted during a settlement conference before the creditor’s discovery of the trust
that his assets “were all gone” because of expensive experimental cancer
treatments.  Id. at 690.
149. See In re Montgomery, 104 B.R. 112 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989).
150. See id. at 115; see also In re Fink, 153 B.R. 883 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993)
(enforcing choice of New York law in similar annuity).
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It has also been suggested that a creditor in a bankruptcy court
could contend that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code
suggests that section 541(c) was intended to apply to traditional
spendthrift trusts that are established by third parties for the
benefit of the debtor.151  This argument provides a creditor with
another arrow in his quiver should the bankruptcy judge decide
that the applicable nonbankruptcy law would otherwise be that
chosen by the settlor of the trust.
Outside the bankruptcy context, a non-Alaskan court may
similarly choose not to enforce the spendthrift provision of an
Alaska Trust because it violates a strong public policy of the forum
state.  Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
dictates the circumstances under which a court should refuse to
apply the law chosen by parties to a contract:
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties
or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for
the parties’ choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would
be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.152
The comments to section 187 state that a court should “not
refrain from applying the chosen law merely because this would
lead to a different result than would be obtained under the local
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law.”153  Section 188,
which is used to determine the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice by the parties to a contract, sets out five factors
that are used to determine the jurisdiction with “the most
significant relationship”154 to the contract: the place of contracting;
the place of negotiation of the contract; the place of performance;
the location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business
of the parties.155
Although by no means certain, it is likely that the home state
of a non-Alaskan settlor will be the jurisdiction with the most
significant relationship to the contract under section 188.  Without
151. See Giordani & Osborne, supra note 100, at 12 (citing HR Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1977)).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187(2) (1971).
153. Id. § 187 cmt. g.
154. Id. § 188(1).
155. See id. § 188(2).
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explicitly stating its intention, the court in Portnoy essentially
applied the test suggested by the Restatement in determining that
the Channel Islands policy was contrary to the strong public policy
of New York, which had a materially greater interest in the
determination of the issue.  The Alaska Trusts have generally been
recommended for those seeking a “rainy day” sort of fund, rather
than those seeking the strong asset protection available overseas.156
If this is indeed the typical settlor, it is unlikely that a bankruptcy
court faced with the task of determining the validity of a
spendthrift provision will be presented with facts as extreme as
those in Portnoy, and therefore more likely that the provision will
be enforced.
B. Tax and Estate Planning Benefits
Internal Revenue Code section 2036 provides the rule for the
inclusion or exclusion of a decedent’s interest in a trust from the
value of his estate for estate tax purposes:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money’s worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death —
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom.157
On its face, the provision would seem to indicate that any retention
of control or enjoyment of the assets would result in inclusion of
those assets in the debtor’s estate for estate tax purposes.  Tax
courts have generally held that where distributions to the settlor
are at the unfettered discretion of the trustee, a transfer is
“complete for tax purposes.”158  The transfer is not complete,
though, if state law permits creditors of the settlor/beneficiary to
reach the assets of the trust for satisfaction of their claims.159
However, the Seventh Circuit has held that where there is no right
156. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 100, at 31.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1994).
158. Estate of German v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 641, 643 (1985) (quoting
Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 153, 162 (1981)).
159. See id.
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to compel the trustee to pay (i.e. the settlor is a discretionary
beneficiary), the trust estate should not be included in the gross
estate, regardless of the ability of the settlor’s creditors to reach the
corpus of the estate.160  Thus, it is unclear to what extent a creditor’s
ability to reach the assets held in trust will determine the inclusion
or exclusion of those assets in the settlor/beneficiary’s gross estate.
The exclusion of assets from a settlor’s gross estate is unlikely
to be an automatic consequence of the transfer of those assets to an
Alaska Trust.  In a private letter ruling, the IRS held that a transfer
to a trust resembling an Alaska Trust naming the settlor and his
living descendants as beneficiaries was complete for gift tax
purposes.161  In doing so, however, the IRS stated, “We are
expressly not ruling on whether the assets held under the Trust
agreement at the time of Donor’s death will be includible in
Donor’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.”162
Although no conclusion can be drawn from the IRS’s
withholding of judgment on the estate tax issue, it indicates, at the
very least, that it is a close question that may be subject to case-by-
case determinations.  The determination should resemble that
made by a bankruptcy judge ruling on whether the assets belong in
the debtor/settlor’s estate.  The decision will depend not simply
upon the choice of law by the settlor, but upon the degree of
control retained by the settlor.  For example, the absence of other
beneficiaries during the settlor’s life or a retention of the power to
veto distributions to other beneficiaries during the settlor’s life
would be strong evidence that the settlor enjoyed the benefits of
the trust assets up to the point of his death and that the assets
should, therefore, be included in his gross estate for estate tax
purposes.
Similar legislation which was recently passed in Delaware is
less likely to provide the above-described estate planning
advantages because it permits certain classes of creditors to reach
the assets of the trust.  Specifically, the Delaware statute does not
apply to any person to whom the settlor is indebted as a result of
an order to pay child support or alimony, regardless of whether the
indebtedness was incurred before or after the transfer into the
160. See In re Estate of Uhi, 241 F.2d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1957); see also
Skinner’s Estate v. United States, 316 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that
the assets of a trust should be included in the settlor’s estate only because of
evidence of an agreement between the settlor/beneficiary and the trustee that the
trustee’s discretion would be exercised exclusively in favor of the settlor for her
life).
161. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (Sept. 11, 1998).
162. Id.
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trust.163  By comparison, the Alaska Trust Act provides for a child
support exception that applies only if the indebtedness arose before
the transfer into the trust.164  The protections of the Delaware
legislation are similarly unavailable to a settlor as against a tort
creditor if the claim arose before the establishment of the trust.165
Such access to the property held in trust may prevent the settlor
from claiming that the transfer is complete for estate tax purposes.
C. Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The rule against perpetuities has been described as a
“technicality-ridden legal nightmare, designed to meet problems of
past centuries that are almost nonexistent today.”166  While this
sentiment may be shared by most law students, there are many who
place a great deal of importance on the continued impact of the
rule, which is simply a rule against remoteness of vesting.  In his
testimony before the Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee, Jeffrey
Schoenblum, Professor of Law at Vanderbilt, warned that the lack
of a rule against perpetuities was a contributing factor in the
downfall of the Ottoman Empire.167  The Committee, however,
decided not to adopt an amendment to the Act that would exempt
real property from the abolition of the rule.168  Alaska thus joined
South Dakota,169 Delaware,170 Idaho,171 and Wisconsin172 in the group
of states that has eliminated or substantially limited the rule against
perpetuities.  An exception for real property may not have even
made much difference, however, as settlors could place the interest
in the land in a corporation (which may last in perpetuity), and
transfer the shares of the corporation into the trust.173  However,
163. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573(1) (Supp. 1998).
164. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(4) (LEXIS 1998).
165. See id. § 3573(2).
166. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1954).
167. See Senate Hearings, supra note 88.
168. See id.
169. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997) (stating simply that “[t]he
common-law rule against perpetuities is not in force in this state”).
170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (Supp. 1998) (abolishing the common-
law rule against perpetuities and requiring only that real property held in trust be
distributed to the beneficiaries after 110 years as though the trust terminated).
171. See IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994) (extending the common-law rule against
perpetuities for twenty-five years).
172. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West Supp. 1998) (extending the common-
law rule against perpetuities for thirty years).
173. See Senate Hearings, supra note 88.
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because even proponents of the Act do not recommend that non-
Alaskan land be placed in Alaska Trusts, the abolition of the rule
will not have significant effect on land outside of Alaska.174
V.  CONCLUSION
The Alaska Trust Act was conceived not out of sympathy for
the victims of an increasingly litigious society, but rather to attract
the fees that accompany the management and administration of
trusts.  The protection allegedly afforded by the trusts runs
contrary to well-established public policy in nearly every other U.S.
jurisdiction.  Regardless of the reasoning behind the legislation and
the ethical issues implicated by the use of Alaska Trusts, the
Alaska Trust Act will, at the very least, place significant hurdles in
the path of creditors seeking to reach trust assets and potentially
shield them entirely.  Yet, satisfying the minimum requirements of
the Act will not automatically provide the protection promised, as
a court may consider the assets sufficiently within the settlor’s
dominion to allow creditors to reach them.  On the other hand,
when the facts are more benign, a court may give full effect to the
choice of law provision in an Alaska Trust and prevent creditors
from attaching trust assets.  The uncertainty of the effectiveness of
Alaska Trusts as true asset protection devices renders their use as
such quite risky and inadvisable.
As an estate planning tool, however, the outlook is brighter,
although still somewhat unclear.  Presumably, the IRS will soon
rule on the excludability of trust assets from a settlor’s gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.  Again, the determination will
depend on the degree of control exercised by the settlor over the
trust assets.  All that is clear is that much remains unclear with
regard to the Alaska Trusts.  A potential settlor seeking the asset
protection and estate planning benefits promised by the
proponents of the trusts would be well advised to exercise caution.
Jeremy M. Veit
174. See E-mail from Richard Hompesch II, Hompesch & Associates (on file
with author).
